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NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to compel Defendant City to issue Plain-
tiff a license to sell beer and for damages for refusing to 
issue to Plaintiff a license to sell beer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 10, 1978, Plaintiff filed an action 
in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, State 
of Utah, against the city of North Salt Lake, a municipal corp-
oration, and the members of the city council. Plaintiff sought 
a judgment declaring to be unlawful the City's beer licensing 
and regulation ordinance to the extent that it limited the number 
of retail beer outlets to four. 
Prior to filing its Complaint, Plaintiff had applied for a 
class A retail beer license to sell beer at its place of business 
where it also sells gasoline and groceries. The city council 
denied the application on the basis that there were then seven 
retail beer outlets in the City and Ordinance No. 77-8 restricts 
the number of retail beer outlets to four. !./ 
!/ Ordinance No. 77-8 also prohibits the sale of beer where gasoline 
is sold. The ordinance also provides that it "shall not operate 
to reduce the number of businesses now licensed to sell beer 
whether issued by this municipality or by the county is such 
business is annexed .... " Several businesses holding county 
authorized beer licenses have been annexed since the ordinance 
was adopted. 
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Plaintiff's sole challenges to the action of the City in 
denying its application to sell beer are that there is no statu-
tory legislation enabling the City to restrict the number of retail 
outlets for the sale of beer and that the City must justify the ordin-
ance by presenting evidence showing the need for such an ordinance. 
Defendants otherwise accept Plaintiff's statement of facts in 
its Brief, except that Defendants maintain that the statutory 
enabling legislation cited by Plaintiff show that the City 
has authority to restrict the number of retail outlets selling 
beer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. NORTH SALT LAKE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO 
ENACT AN ORDINANCE RESTRICTING THE 
NUMBER OF BUSINESSES SELLING BEER 
AT RETAIL. 
Municipalities exercise their legislative powers through 
ordinances. :?:_/ 
Utah law provides in part: 
The governing body may pass any ordinance 
to regulate, require, prohibit, control 
or supervise any activity, business, 
conduct or condition authorized by this 
act or any other provision of law. lf 
Utah law also provides: 
The powers herein delegated to any muni-
cipality shall be liberally construed to 
permit the municipality to exercise the 
powers granted by this act except in cases 
clearly contrary to the intent of the law. !f 
2/ Section 10-3-701, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Supp. 1977). 
3/ Id. at section 10-3-702. 
!; Id. at section 10-1-103. 
-2-
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The foregoing provisions were enacted as one act in Laws 
of Utah 1977, Chapter 48. 
Utah law also provides: 
Cities and towns within their corporate 
limits ... shall have the power to license, 
tax, regulate or prohibit the sale of light 
beer, at retail, in bottles or draft .... ~/ 
Plaintiff urges this Court to hold that the City has no 
power to restrict the sale of beer except at retail or draft 
(the phrase "other original containers" not appearing in the 
act) and that the City may not restrict the number of "class 
A" retail beer licenses for the reason that there is no specific 
enabling legislation. 
Defendants submit that Plaintiff's objection to the phrase 
"other original containers" is a distinction without substance. 
Section 32-4-17 enables cities to "license, tax, regulate or 
prohibit the sale of light bee.r, at retail, in bottles or draft •••. " 
Plaintiff urges this court to hold that the term "regula-
tion" as used in section 32-4-17 means something other than the 
authority to limit the number of retail beer licenses. Presum-
ably, that something other means hours of business or perhaps the 
location within the store or the city where beer may be sold. Yet 
Plaintiff's Complaint buttresses Defendants' position. 
Prior to 1935, state law prescribed the number of retail beer 
licenses which could be issued according to population. The sta-
tute, cited by Plaintiff at page 4 of its Complaint, was repealed 
~/ Id. at section 32-4-17. 
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in 1937 and the present enabling legislation was enacted. 
Essentially, the legislature determined that the sale of beer 
should be regulated at the local level. 
It is well settled that municipalities may 
be invested with the power to limit the 
number of liquor licenses to be issued 
within their boundaries, and under such 
delegated authority may enact ordinances 
restricting or limiting the number of 
licenses that may be granted for the conduct 
of liquor business within the municipal 
limits. In fact, it has been said that the 
mere vesting of a municipality with the 
power to regulate the retail sale of intox-
icating liquors vests the municipality with 
the power to fix by ordinance a reasonable 
limit on the number of retail liquor licenses 
to be issued. §_/ 
It seems that municipalities may be invested 
with the power to limit the number of liquor 
licenses to be issued within the boundaries, 
and that where this authority is delegated, 
either expressly or under a general charter 
power of regulation, ordinances in pursuance of 
such grant of authority will be upheld as valid. ?J 
Generally, under power to regulate and license liquor vending 
places, a municipal corporation can limit the number of licenses 
§_/ 
21 
45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §135; Thielen v. Kostelecky, 
69 N.D. 410, 287 N.W. 513. 
124 A.L.R. 820 (1939); People ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Harrison, 
99 N.E. 903 (Ill. 1912); State ex rel. Howie v. Northfield 
101 N.W. 1063 (Minn. 1904); State ex rel. Mcintire v. Libby 
82 P.2d 587 (Mont. 1938); In Re Jorgensen, 106 N.W. 462 (Neb. 
1906); Bjordal v. Town Board of Town of Delvan, 230 Wisc. 543, 
284 N .W. 534 (1939) . 
-4-
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to be issued to vendors and vending establishments. ~/ 
The regulation or prohibition of intoxicating liquors or of 
their sale, traffic or possession is within or based on, or 
constitutes an exercise of the police power. The right to regulate 
the sale of intoxicating liquors by the legislative power given if 
within the police power of the state is practically limitless. ~ 
In Shaw v. Orem City, l_Q_I the court cited Riggins v. District 
Court where the plaintiff had challenged an ordinance prohibiting the 
sale of beer on Sunday arguing that light beer was not an intoxicant. 
The Riggins court held: 
9/ 
Io; 
11/ 
The authority of the state to control and 
regulate the sale and use of light beer 
as defined in the act does not depend 
upon its being characterized by the 
act as intoxicating. The authority of 
the state under its police power to 
regulate the manufacture and use of 
light beer is to be determined by the 
nature of such beer rather than by the 
general characterization given to it by 
the lawmaking body. 11/ 
9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §26.191; Gartland_y_,_ 
Talbott, 72 Idaho 125, 237 P.2d 1067 (1951); State v. City 
Council of Northfield, 94 Minn. 18, 101 N.W. 1063 (1904); 
State v. Womach 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W. 2d 809 (1946); State 
v. City Council of City of Libby, 107 Mont. 216, 82 P.2d 
587 (1938); Parks v. Allen, 426 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1970); 
De Caro v. Collierville 213 Tenn. 254, 373 S.W.2d 466 (1963); 
Winther v. Village of Weippe, 91 Idaho 798, 430 P.2d 689 
( 1967). 
Shaw v. or~m City, 117 Utah 288, 214 P.2d 888 (1950). 
Ibid. 
89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935). 
-5-
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In Shaw v. Orem City the court held: 
That the state may prohibit the sale of 
intoxicating liquors is too well settled 
to require citation of authority. It may 
delegate such powers to cities. State v. 
Briggs, 46 Utah 288, 146 P.261. 
* * * 
The power conferred is to "license, tax, 
regulate or prohibit" the sale of light 
beer at retail. It seems to us patent 
that since a city may prohibit, it may 
elect not to prohibit but to permit, 
under such conditions or restrictions 
as the descretion of its governing 
authority may dictate, subject, or course 
to conformity with state law. 12/ 
In Shaw, the Court quoted favorably from Gunnarssohn 
v. City of Sterling, !l/ as follows: 
The language of the ordinance is not as 
broad and comprehensive as that of the city 
council to prohibit without any restriction 
whatever, while the latter only prohibits 
in less quantities than five gallons. A 
general power to prohibit is obviously 
sufficient to authorize any partial prohibi-
tion deemed advisable. 
It appears from the language of Shaw that the Utah 
Courts construe the word "prohibit" to mean "regulate". 
Section 10-8-42 authorizes cities to prohibit the sale of beer. 
Following the rationale of Shaw cities could prohibit more than 
four retail outlets from selling beer within the city limits. 
As section 32-4-17 enables cities to regulate the retail sale 
of beer, it is unnecessary to argue that prohibit also includes 
the authority to limit. It is clear from the statutes and Utah 
I27 Op cit. fn. 9. 
13/ 92 Ill. 569 at 573. 
-6-
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case law that Utah municipalities are given broad latitude in 
regulating the retail sale of beer and that the enabling legis-
lation is to be construed to accomplish the legislative purpose. 
In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. The Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Company 14/ the telephone company argued 
that Salt Lake City had no authority to grant the railroad the 
use of the city streets under a statute which provided that the 
City: 
14/ 
15/ 
... may construct, maintain and operate 
waterworks, sewer collection, sewer 
treatment systems, gas works, electric 
light works, telephone lines or public 
transportation systems, or authorize 
the construction, maintenance and opera-
tion of the same by others.... (Emphasis 
the Courts) 15/ 
The Court held: 
Consistent with the view taken by the 
authorities generally, this Court has 
approved a somewhat broad and realistic 
view of grants of authority to render a 
public service. In the case of Ogden City 
Ry. Co. v. Ogden City, et al., the plain-
tiff had been granted permission in 1883 to 
operate a street railway under a statute 
which authorized the city to exercise the 
power of eminent domain over streets in 
behalf of steam and horse railways. Seven 
years later, the city authorized another 
company to operate an electric street rail-
road over the same streets. The plaintiff 
there argued that the statute did not authorize 
the city to permit its streets to be used in 
P.2d (Utah April 12. 1979). 
Section 10-8-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
-7-
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connection with electric railroads. The court 
observed that at the time of the enactment, 
electric railways were not mentioned because 
they were not in use, but that through ingenuity 
and invention they had come into use and were 
performing the same function as the horse 
railways had done. The court concluded that 
in carrying out the purpose of the law, the 
statute should be construed to include electric 
railways. The same principle of law was applied 
in the later case of Rich v. Salt Lake City Corp. 
The question arose as to whether the city could 
engage in bus transportation under a statute which 
permitted cities to "construct, maintain and oper-
ate ... telephone lines or transportation systems, 
or authorize the construction, maintenance and oper-
ation of the same by others. " This Court rejected 
the argument of plaintiff that the language should be 
given a narrow and restrictive application. In 
accordance with what we think is the sound doctrine: 
that the law and its interpretation should 
keep abreast of changing conditions, it adopted 
the realistic view that inasmuch as motor buses 
had become the more practical means of street trans-
portation, the authorization of the city to maintain 
and operate transportation systems was not limited 
to the former "street railway," but should reasonably 
be deemed to include transportation by buses . .!:.§_/ 
Defendants submit that the clear legislative intent is directed 
toward the regulation of the sale of beer, not whether the beer is 
sold in bottles, cans or at draft. It is illogical to maintain 
that cities may regulate the sale of beer sold in bottles or at 
draft, but not in cans or plastic baggies. 
In the Union Pacific case, supra, the court added a footnote: 
20 Utah 2d 339, 437 P.2d 680(1968); cf also Spangler v. 
Corless, 61 Utah 88, 211 P.692 where this court held 
that under the exemption statute, sec. 6925(6) C.L.U. 
1917 of " .one horse, with vehicle and harness,. 
used by a physician . ." was held to exempt an automobile; 
and the fact that the motive power is gasoline instead of 
a horse was not of material significance. 
-8-
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POINT II. THE CITY NEED NOT PRESENT PROOF 
OF THE EVILS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
SALE OF BEER IN ORDER TO RESTRICT 
THE NUMBER OF RETAIL OUTLETS. 
Defendants submit that the City need only demonstrate 
enabling legislation to establish the legality of its ordinances. 
It need not present any factual basis showing the need for the 
ordinance, the enactment of ordinances being a legislative func-
tion of elected municipal officials. 
However, in this case, it is submitted that the Court may 
take judicial notice that the sale and consumption of an alcoholic 
beverage is somewhat of more concern to the public safety, health 
and welfare than hours a barber keeps in his place of business. 
The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibited 
the sale of liquor, except for medical uses. In repealing the 
Eighteenth Amendment, the Twenty-first Amendment conferred some-
thing more than normal state authority over the public health, 
welfare, and morals. 17/ 
In Stanton v. Superior Court in and for Graham County, 18/ 
the court held that the police power of the state is fully compe-
tent to regulate the liquor business and to mitigate its evils or 
suppress it entirely. The court also held that a citizen has no 
inherent right to sell intoxicating liquors, and since the liquor 
business is attended with danger to the community, it may be 
entirely prohibited or it may be permitted under such conditions 
as will limit to the utmost its evils. 
Arizona State Liquor Board v. Poulos, 112 Ariz. 119, 
538 P.2d 393 (1975). 
5 5 Ariz . 514 , 10 3 P . 2 d 9 5 2 ( 19 4 0) . 
-9-
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In Garcia v. Arizona State Llqu~Boacd, !V the court held 
that states have power to regulate in the field of intoxicating 
liquors in a manner which would ::ie precluded by other provisions 
of the Cons ti tu ti on if other commodities or activi. ties were 
involved. 
In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirley, ~ the court held that the 
state had particularly broad powers with respect to the manufacture 
of and traffic in alcoholic beverages because of the damages to 
the public health and safety inherent in the sale and use of 
alcohol. 
Defendants submit that the overwhelming, if not unanimous, 
opinions of the courts, which have considered the matter, hold that 
the sale of liquor may be controlled, regulated or prohibited as 
an exercise of the police powers and that such regulations made 
take a form different than that which would be permitted for other 
businesses. QI 
19/ 21 Ariz. App. 456, 520 P.2d 852 (1974). 
20/ 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971). 
21/ See Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control, 420 P.2d 735, 55 Cal. Reptr. 23 (1966); 
Sibert v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 337 
P.2d 882, 169 C.A. 2d 563 (1959); Farah v. Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 324 P.2d 98, 159 C.A. 2d 
335 (1958); State v. Meyers, 376 P.2d 710, 85 Idaho 129 
(1962); Tri-State Hotel Co. v. Londerholm, 408 P.2d 877, 
195 Kan. 748 (1965); Drink, Inc. v. Babock, 421 P.2d 
798, 77 N.M. 277 (1966); Yarbrough v. Montoya, 214 P.2d 
769, 54 N.M. 91 (1950); Alamogordo Imp. Co. v. Prender-
gast, 109 P.2d 254, 45 N.M. 40 (1941); State ex rel. Hart 
v:---Parham, 412 P.2d 142 Okla. 1966; Marcus v. State ex rel. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 411 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1966); 
Houser v. State, 540 P.2d 412, 85 Wash. 2d 803 (1975). 
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Additionally, in Utah, the sale of liquor containing more than 
three and two-tenths alcohol by volume is a state regulated mono-
poly. ~/ 
It is submitted that the Court may properly take notice of 
the problems related to the sale and consumption of alcoholic 
beverages. An ordinance regulating the sale of beer would be 
valid and the City need not present evidence of. the particular pro-
blems related to the sale and consumption of beer. An ordinance 
enacted under specific and valid authority from the legislature 
should be sustained regardless of the court's opionion of the 
reasonableness of the ordinance. 23/ 
POINT III. THE NORTH SALT LAKE BEER ORDINANCE 
DOES NOT DENY PLAINTIFF EQUAL PROTECTION 
Plaintiff suggests that the City's classification of beer lie-
ences into classes A, B, and C raises equal protection issues. 
Defendants submit that the classifications are for revenue pur-
poses only. The applicant m'ay have any classfication he or she 
desires, if there are licenses available. Plaintiff appears to 
suggest that if the City issues a class A license, it must also 
issue a class B and a C license, or, that it must issue at least 
two licenses for each classification in order to avoid the 
22/ 
23/ 
Sections 32-1-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Huston v. Des Moins, 176 Iowa 455, 156 N.W. 883 (1916); 
State v. Chicago, M & St. P. R. Co., 114 Minn. 122, 130 
N.W. 545 (1911); Lake View v. Tate, 130 Ill. 247, 22 N.E. 
791 (1889); Roswell v. Bateman, 20 N.M. 77, 146 P. 954 
(1915); 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, section 362. 
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chance of creating a monopoly. Such an argument, if success-
ful, would destroy the power to restrict the number of retail 
beer outlets. 
Finally, Plaintiff urges this Court to require a system 
of rotating beer licenses. That position was not raised below 
and should not be raised here. However, the case of Anderson 
v. Utah County Board of Commissioners, ~ correctly observes 
that a person having a license and in operation "should have 
some preference over any new application .... " 
Defendants submit that the preference over a new applicant 
may have been grounded on the distinction recognized by the 
courts between an application for a renewal and a new application. 
Ordinarily, a person who makes an application for a liquor 
license does not have a vested right to engage in the liquor 
business. ~/ The denial of a license by a proper authority with 
discretion in the matter generally does not deprive an applicant 
of either liberty or property. ~ By contrast, the application 
for a renewal of a liquor license was considered subject to pro-
cedural due process. In Manos v. City of Green Bay, 3}_/ the court 
found that the applicant had a "property" interest in the renewal 
of his liquor license in that he had investment which the appli-
cant had in physical improvements to his business and his expecta-
tion that he would be in business for over one year were sufficient 
to warrant the guarantee of minimal due process. In reaching this 
24/ 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979). 
25; !U_ordal v. Town Board of Town of Delvan, supra, n. 7. 
~/ 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd ~pp. 508-510, 
Section 26.195. 
'!:2J 3 72 F . Supp . 4 0 ( 19 7 4 ) . 
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decision the court held: 
The plaintiff in this case has a sub-
stantial property interest in retention 
of his liquor license, since, if the 
revocation is allowed, he will not 
only lose his sole source of income, but 
will also lose a substantial sum of 
money which he has invested in physical 
improvements to his business establishment. ~ 
Plaintiff's suggestion that some system of rotation be required 
by this Court is illogical and would impose burdens on existing 
licensees which very well may be prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. ~/ 
CONCLUSION 
1. The City of North Salt Lake has statutory enabling authority 
to restrict the number of retail beer outlets to four. 
2. The City may properly refuse to issue a new license to 
sell beer where the number of existing retail beer outlets exceeds 
four. 
3. The City classification for the sale of beer is not arbitrary, 
unreasonable or capricious or a denial of equal protection. 
4. No evidence beyond that contained in the record is required 
in order to show that the City's beer licensing ordinance is lawful. 
28/ Id. at 372 F. Supp. 47. 
29/ See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 532 (1973). 
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Respectfully submitted this ~~~-day of ~~~~~-' 1979. 
MICHAEL T. McCOY 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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